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ABSTRACT 
ADVISOR-INDUCED DEMAND AND MORAL HAZARD  
IN THE THIRD-PARTY PAYER SYSTEM 
 
by David Chandler Thomas 
 
Health-care consumption in the United States has risen from 5.2% in 1960 to 
17.8% of 2009 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) creating a burden that will soon be too 
heavy for the economy to bear.  This paper proposes that the primary accelerants of 
health-care expenditures result from the third-party payer system that emerged in the 
1950s.  These corporate benefits and government subsidies, when overlaid on the 
traditional health-care model, have led to sustained increases in the production, 
recommendation, and consumption of health care while magnifying the moral hazard 
problem inherent in health insurance. 
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1. THE PROBLEM 
 
Health-care consumption in the United States has increased from 5.2% in 1960 to 
17.8% of 2009 Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  This does not fully reflect the more than 
833% per capita increase in terms of real dollars1, because average household income has 
been increasing at the same time (US DHHS 2010).  The rising cost of health care is 
becoming a burden too heavy for employers, federal and state governments, and 
individuals to bear. 
From different sides of the debate, the blame for rising expenditures has been, at 
various times and by various groups, placed on the shoulders of insurance companies, 
health-care providers, trial lawyers, drug companies, and the very government attempting 
to solve the problem.   
Economists, while generally not pointing the finger of blame, propose a wide 
variety of causal factors for the rising expenditures, including tax-induced corporate 
subsidies and innovation (Henderson 2002), informational asymmetries and supplier-
induced demand (Mitchell and Sass 1995), retrospective insurance mechanisms 
(Weisbrod 1991), increasing inefficiencies from bureaucratic administration (Friedman 
1992), heavy regulations and structural distortions (Goldhill 2009), medical licensing 
restrictions and pricing practices (Feldstein 1981) (Arrow 1963), and the selection of 
inefficient procedures (J. P. Newhouse 1996).  While these proposals reflect much of 
                                                
1 Health-care expenditures, as referenced in this report, are shown as 2005 dollars in per capita 
amounts.  The 1960 per capita health-care expenditures of $789.81 dollars rose to $7,368.60 dollars in 
2009—an increase of 833%.  Per capita GDP grew over the same period in 2005 dollars from $15,203.55 in 
1960 to $41,310.90 in 2009—an increase of 172%.  
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what is wrong with the current health-care system, they do not fully explain either the 
fifty years of increases in health-care expenditures or the dramatic increases in the 
incidence of high-risk health conditions over the same period. 
Working from the assumption that participants in the health-care system are 
rational in pursuing their self-interests, this paper proposes that the primary accelerants of 
health-care expenditures result from the third-party payer system that emerged in the 
1950s.  These corporate and government subsidized health-care benefits, when overlaid 
on the traditional health-care triad of patient, primary physician, and service provider, 
encourage advisor-induced demand, leading to sustained increases in the production, 
recommendation, and consumption of health-care products and services while 
magnifying the existing moral hazard problem inherent in health insurance. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
Health care, before the twentieth century, operated on the relatively simple 
economic model shown in Figure 1.  Patients relied on their primary-care physician to act 
as a trusted advisor that diagnosed, recommended, and in most cases performed any 
necessary medical procedures.  The asymmetric information problem, arising from the 
complexity of medical science, existed on a reduced scale since much of the medical 
technology of today did not exist until the second half of the twentieth century.  Because 
payment flowed directly from the patient to the health-care provider, demand for services 
operated on a downward sloping curve, albeit an inelastic one (Ringel, et al. 2000).  The 
limited services and high out-of-pocket costs increased inelasticity by encouraging 
families to pursue home remedies until the services for a physician became critical. 
 
 
Figure 1     Traditional Health-Care Economic Model 
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The health-care system began to change with the introduction of significant 
medical technologies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The need to 
manage the rise of unpredictable health-care costs was partly responsible for the 
formation and growth of large numbers of mutual aid societies.  These mostly fraternal 
orders allowed members to pool risk, and relied on social pressure to minimize the side 
effects of the asymmetric information problem.  The mutual aid societies began to decline 
with the introduction of social security in 1935 (Beito 2000).   
As the development of new high-cost medical treatments increased, so did the 
demand for health insurance.  Like traditional insurance products, the initial incarnations 
covered only those procedures that were expensive and unpredictable.  This model of 
insurance, portrayed in Figure 2, was efficient because insurance companies had to select 
the combination of coverage, patient out-of-pocket, and premiums that would maximize 
profitability.  Of course, they did their best to address the problems of adverse selection2 
and moral hazard3 by instituting waiting periods, ex-ante medical exams, and high 
deductibles or co-payments.  
 
                                                
2 Adverse selection in health care describes the positive correlation between the demand for health 
insurance and the risk of loss.  Taking advantage of asymmetric information about their medical condition, 
patients are able to under-pay for coverage.  In other words, patients with a higher likelihood of making a 
claim are more inclined to purchase health insurance and withhold information on the level of risk to avoid 
paying higher premiums.  Insurance companies attempt to address adverse selection by restricting coverage 
on pre-existing conditions, by requiring a health examination and medical background check prior to 
approval, or by accepting only large groups that have 100% group coverage. 
3 Moral hazard is in play when patients are convinced that the side effects of a risky lifestyle are 
less likely to affect their pocketbooks, thus increasing the likelihood they will engage in behaviors such as 
over-eating, exercising less, or eating unhealthy foods.  Insurance companies traditionally rely on three 
mechanisms to address moral hazard:  patient deductibles—the higher the deductible, the more the patient 
shares in the upfront risk; co-insurance, where the patient shares in a percentage of the cost and risk; and 
restricting coverage for claims that can result from certain high-risk behavior. 
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The changes in the health-care system that led to the sustained increases in the 
levels of health-care consumption and medical prices began during World War II.  The 
ramp-up of military production created a greater scarcity of labor and materials needed to 
produce non-war goods and services, putting pressure on employers to increase wages 
and prices.  To keep reported inflation under control, the federal government ordered a 
wage and price freeze, making it even more difficult for employers to hire or retain 
workers and meet the market demand for goods.  Operating under the wage freeze, 
American businesses uncovered a legal loophole that allowed them to offer in-kind wage 
increases by providing subsidized health-care benefits to their employees.  The 
government ordered a second wage freeze to address inflation during the Korean War.  
 
Figure 2     Catastrophic Health-Care Economic Model 
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Again, employers enticed workers with medical coverage, and many companies, not 
previously providing the benefit, felt competitive pressure to offer it following the war.  
Because of the tax savings, companies kept the benefits in place when the freeze 
ended (Scofea 1994).  The Internal Revenue Service became aware of the loophole and 
attempted to tax the insurance benefit as post-tax wages until Congress, responding to the 
protestations of business and employees, codified the pre-tax status of the benefit.  
Except for a brief respite, provided by the 1964 Johnson-Kennedy and 1981 Reagan tax 
cuts, the marginal tax rate rose in the second half of the twentieth century, further 
increasing the value of health-care insurance as a pre-tax benefit (Henderson 2002).  
To implement health-care benefits, employers contracted with the existing 
medical insurance companies to manage the reimbursement of medical expenses on their 
behalf.  Thus was born the third-party payer system, which has grown to become a 
massive industry.  Today, the top ten insurance providers generate $280 billion dollars in 
annual revenues and more than $12.5 billion dollars in net annual profits (Fortune 
Magazine 2011). 
In 1966, the federal government introduced Medicaid, a state-administered 
subsidy for qualifying low-income families, and Medicare, a federal subsidy for senior 
citizens, both modeled after the private sector health-care insurance system and 
subsidized by a tax on working Americans.  Drug coverage became part of Medicare 
benefits in 2004 during the George W. Bush administration.   
In an effort to address the lack of appropriate pricing signals in the third-party 
payer system, the U.S. Congress authorized the use of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) in 
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2003 as pre-tax savings generally linked to a high-deductible insurance plan.  Owned and 
typically funded by the employee, an HSA allows the owner to build up a tax-free savings 
account to pay directly for health-care expenses not covered by insurance.  Any unused 
portion of an HSA rolls over to future years and employment, ultimately converting into a 
retirement account (Glied and Remler 2005). 
The Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress passed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Health Care Act of 2010, mandating universal and partially-
subsidized health insurance as an effort to halt runaway health-care costs.  Republicans, 
the business community, and many health-care professionals objected to the use of 
mandates and expanded government intrusion in health care.  The Obama 
administration’s push for this legislation was, in fact, one of the factors that energized the 
Tea Party movement.  By early 2011, more than half the states had filed actions in federal 
court to have all or part of the act declared unconstitutional.  At the writing of this paper, 
the economic and social impacts as well as the future legal status of the act are unknown.   
Today, U.S. health-care insurance relies on the third-party payer system to 
reimburse health-care providers for both insurable and uninsurable claims including most 
catastrophic, emergent, and routine procedures, as reflected in Figure 3.  In this thesis, 
catastrophic or insurable events refer to medical conditions that are high-cost and 
unforeseen; emergent describes conditions that require paramedic, ambulance, or 
emergency-room services; while routine encompasses low-cost chronic, ambulatory, and 
urgent care.  
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Consider the analogy of homeowners insurance.  Most homeowners are willing to 
purchase insurance to deal with the catastrophic financial impact of acts of God and man 
that can cost thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars, and threaten life and 
savings—including fire, flood, theft, wind, and, in some cases, earthquakes.  
Homeowners rely on local fire and police departments, usually financed by property 
taxes, to address the emergent impact of both acts.  Homeowners do not expect their 
insurance to reimburse for routine wear-and-tear such as plumbing repairs, carpet 
cleaning, or replacing burned out light bulbs.  What we currently call “health insurance” 
  
Figure 3     Current Health-Care Economic Model 
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covers the medical equivalent of tornado damage, a 911 call to report an intruder, and the 
fee to have a plumber unclog a toilet.   
Primarily an employer-provided benefit or government subsidy, the third-party 
payer system currently negotiates group rates and reimburses health-care providers for 
most medical procedures.  The third-party payer system is now the health-care industry 
standard and provides subtle but powerful incentives that affect the behavior of each 
participant in the health-care system.  Understanding these incentives is essential to 
discovering the underlying causes of the rising health-care expenditures.  
 
 10 
 
3. INCENTIVES 
 
The adoption of the third-party payer system has altered the incentives of the 
participants in the health-care system.  The inefficiencies of the incentive structure 
become fully apparent when the overall impact on prices and the level of health-care 
consumption is considered.  The following portrays the incentives and behavior of each 
participant, in the context of a pending healthy childbirth. 
The Patient.  Deemed a non-insurable event before the passage of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), normal pregnancy and childbirth were not covered by 
most health insurance policies.  The PDA amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
require employers to include coverage for normal pregnancy and childbirth in their health 
plans (Lapidus 1983).  With pregnancy and childbirth subsidized by the government or 
by her employer, the mother-to-be follows the recommendations of her obstetrician for 
diagnostics, office visits, pharmaceuticals, and other services.  Most prospective mothers 
will seek whatever health services they consider necessary, plus those recommended by 
their physician.  If the expecting patient does not have to pay for more than a small 
deductible or co-payment for medical services, much of the financial restraint on demand 
for care is eliminated.   
The Medical Advisor.  Although the obstetrician is primarily motivated to provide 
for the needs of the patient, two indirect financial incentives also encourage the physician 
to over-prescribe medical services.  First, the negotiated in-network reimbursement rates 
of insurance coverage have eroded the income of the medical practice, encouraging 
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physicians to triage patients to specialists and diagnostic centers in an effort to increase 
the number of patients seen and diagnosed during office hours.  Second, as new 
diagnostics, drugs, and treatments gain mainstream acceptance, physicians feel compelled 
to prescribe the new services to minimize malpractice exposure (Kessler and McClellan 
1996).  These two incentives encourage the promotion of more diagnostics, 
pharmaceuticals, and other services than is economically efficient.  The doctor sees no 
downside to over-prescribing, but a significant downside for under-prescribing, and the 
patient has little financial incentive to push back against the recommendations for 
multiple ultrasounds, an amniocentesis test, or an epidural to manage the pain of labor.   
The Health-care Service Provider.  Health-care service providers have both 
financial and liability incentives to accept and treat any insured patient sent by a 
recommending physician even if they consider the services excessive.  Hospitals, testing 
labs, radiology facilities, and other health-care service providers rely on the 
recommendation of the primary-care physician or specialist to maintain a steady revenue 
stream.  It is essential to their long-term viability that they continually invest in the latest 
technologies, both to remain competitive and to limit legal liability. 
 The Product and Service Supplier.  The firms that develop and produce 
pharmaceuticals, epidural and ultrasound equipment, and other medical innovations are 
incentivized to engage in research and development to meet the growing demand for 
improvements to health care.  Once the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 
independent research and testing have deemed a new breakthrough safe, and even 
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marginally effective, the medical profession is pressured by both ethics and potential 
liability to embrace the new offering.  
The Insurance Company.  Whether for-profit or not-for-profit, the insurance 
company must cover its costs and return a reasonable margin to remain in business.  The 
insurance company adjusts the annual premiums to the employer or government to cover 
cost increases tied to any new services, ensuring that future profitability is unaffected.  To 
manage costs during the premium year, insurers negotiate rates with a network of service 
providers, agreeing to reimburse a discounted amount or percentage of normal billing 
rates.  For service providers outside the network, the coverage is normally limited to a 
percentage of fees or a fixed amount per procedure with the patient responsible for any 
remaining balance.  In-network providers bill patients lacking health insurance at the full 
rate to avoid any further discounts on reimbursements from the insurance companies.  
This is an important business practice for the insurance company because not only does it 
reduce their reimbursement costs, but also the contrast between full retail and the network 
discounts increases consumer demand for medical insurance.  
The Employer.  There are at least two incentives for employers to provide health 
insurance coverage in the workplace.  First, with more than 87% of all private insurance 
subsidized by employers, those workplaces that fail to offer insurance benefits could 
suffer competitively (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).  Second, the tax deductibility of health 
benefits provides a way to increase employee compensation without incurring additional 
social security and Medicare/Medicaid costs (Henderson 2002).   
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The Government.  The government intervenes in the health-care industry in 
response to both public choice and ideological incentives.  First, the powerful health-care 
industry engages in rent seeking by routing millions of dollars to K Street lobbyists, who 
then seek to influence legislation that will benefit the industry.  Second, associations 
representing the powerful voting block of retired persons pressure legislatures to increase 
health-care benefits for their members (Simantov, Schoen and Bruegman 2001).  Third, 
the growth of the “ideology of dependence” has convinced many voters and government 
officials that government redistribution of wealth is not only desirable, but also essential 
(Twight 2002).  
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4. RISING PRICES AND CONSUMPTION 
 
From an accounting perspective, there are only two possible explanations for 
rising health-care expenditures.  First, the real price level of medical services and 
products has been increasing over the past 50 years.  Second, patients have been 
consuming a larger quantity of health-care services.  Equation 1 expresses this 
relationship—where CH represents total health-care expenditures, PH is the price-level of 
health-care products and services, and QH the quantity of health-care consumed.   
  
CH = PH QH 
Equation 1     Price and Quantity on Expenditures 
     
Using data extracted from several U.S. Government sources and applying this 
equation, the values for total expenditures were derived for the years 1960 to 2009.  Total 
expenditures are broken down by the impact of change in the price level vs. change in per 
capita quantity consumed.  Results are displayed as a graph in Figure 4 (U.S. Department 
of Labor 2011) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources 2009) (US DHHS 
2010) (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).  All numbers are per capita and in 2005 dollars.  
While the health-care price level over the period has increased by 66%, the total increase 
in expenditures of 833% is mostly attributable to the 462% increase in the quantity of 
health care consumed.  If the rising price level is overstated because of increased quality 
through the injection of technology improvements, the level of consumption could be 
even higher than stated (J. P. Newhouse 1992). 
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 Several historical factors might have influenced the increase in health-care prices 
shown in Figure 4.  One possible factor is an increase in demand resulting from 
decreasing patient out-of-pocket costs and rising per capita income (Feldstein 1981) 
(Henderson 2002).  A second factor might be an artificial restriction on the supply of 
licensed physicians by the American Medical Association and medical schools (Arrow 
1963).  Finally, prices might be increasing because of the development of new 
technologies that improve the quality or reduce the risk of existing procedures (J. P. 
Newhouse 1992). 
 
Sources: National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds 1960-2009. 
Spreadsheet, Washington: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010. U.S. 
Department of Labor. Consumper Price Index. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2011, 24-October. 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#data (accessed 2011, 24-October). 
Figure 4     Changes in Consumption and Price Level 
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4.1. The Impact of Insurance Subsidies 
With increasing employer and government health-care subsidies, the average 
patient’s out-of-pocket costs and financial risk have declined, encouraging higher levels 
of consumption and therefore driving up prices.  The charts in Figure 5 show the decline 
of out-of-pocket expenditures from 64% in 1960 to only 14% in 2009, with employers 
and government subsidizing the difference.   
 
  
 
To explain the economic impact of the subsidy on consumption and pricing, we 
consider the supply-and-demand graph for health care shown in Figure 6, where point A 
represents the equilibrium for the price of health care (P1) and the quantity (Q1) of health 
care consumed before the introduction of the insurance subsidy.   
 
 
Figure 5     Decline in Out-of-Pocket Expense 
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As the employer or government assumes more of the cost for health care, the 
price to the patient drops to the out-of-pocket price (P2), increasing quantity demanded 
from point A to point B.  Health-care providers raise prices (P3) to match the new 
quantity demanded on the supply curve shown by point C.  This higher price, less the 
patient out-of-pocket, is the amount paid by the third-party payer and financed by the 
employer or government.  The rectangle represented by Points P3, C, B, P2 on the graph 
is the subsidy, and the area P1, A, B, P2 is the in-kind compensation to the patient in the 
form of health-care benefits.  The area represented by Points P3, C, A, P1 is the health-
care service provider gain from the subsidy, and area A, B, C represents the dead-weight 
loss created by the subsidy.  
Economists have argued that the gradual decline in patient out-of-pocket costs can 
explain the sustained increases in both consumption and prices (Henderson 2002).  Since 
 
Figure 6     Supply and Demand for Health Care  
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direct patient demand for health care is normally inelastic, it does not fully explain the 
increasing health-care expenditures.  This is because direct patient demand has three 
built-in constraints.  First, a visit to the doctor incurs the cost of a disruption to daily life; 
second, the patient is often responsible for an insurance deductible or co-pay; and third, 
the demand for health care is naturally inelastic (Koc 2004).  Additional growth in health-
care consumption results from the asymmetric information problem that allows medical 
advisors and suppliers to induce additional patient demand.  The empirical data supports 
this contention, showing very little increase over time in the number of patient-driven 
procedures, such as office calls, compared to the dramatic increase in procedures induced 
by medical advisors and suppliers.  Table 4-1 provides an example comparing the growth 
in the number of patient-initiated adolescent psychiatric office visits with the number of 
physician-induced psychotropic prescriptions (Thomas, et al. 2006).  From 1994-1995 to 
2000-2001, the number of office visits, adjusted for population growth, increased by 
18.6%, while the number of physician-induced prescriptions per office visit grew by 
161.6%. 
 
 
  
Table 4-1     Increased Prescriptions vs. Office Visits 
 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 % 
Visits 15,837,717 18,506,174 18,623,674 18,778,811 18.6 
Visits with Prescription Per 1000 54.2 68.3 89.5 141.8 161.6 
Source: "Trends in the Use of Psychotropic Medications Among Adolescents, 
1994 to 2001." Psychiatric Services, 2006  
 19 
 
4.2. The Impact of Medical Licensing 
The medical profession’s restrictions on licensing have been blamed for limiting 
the supply of physicians, resulting in higher health-care prices (Henderson 2002) (Arrow 
1963).  While the data show that between 2000 and 2009 the number of practicing 
physicians decreased in absolute terms from 313,180 to 301,330 and by 11.8% per capita, 
physician income also decreased in real dollars over the same period (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2010).  At the same time, the decreasing percentage of patient out-of-pocket costs 
increased the demand for health care.  The reduction in physician incomes appears 
inconsistent with a shrinking supply of physicians and a growing demand for health care. 
Another explanation for the decline in the number of physicians is that the drop in 
real physician income has reduced the demand for medical degrees (Sloan 1971).  In the 
current system, physicians are price-takers—dependent on insurance providers, as price-
makers, to set the level of reimbursement, which results in downward pressure on the 
profitability of practicing medicine.  The reduction in the rate of reimbursement results in 
lower profitability and explains the decrease in the number of physicians and the increase 
in the ratio of assistants and nurse practitioners to physician.  Lower reimbursement rates 
encourage physicians to reduce the time they spend personally diagnosing and treating 
each patient to increase the volume of patients treated and therefore the number of 
billable procedures per hour.  In other words, if a doctor spends a fraction of the time 
with each patient, he is able to address an increase in demand while minimizing the 
impact of the reduction in fees on his gross income.  The same explanation might also 
account for the growth of the practice of outsourcing to specialists and diagnostic service 
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providers.  Table 4-2 shows the ratio of health-care workers to physicians in 2000 and 
2009, indicating 28.5% more health-care workers per physician over the period.  This 
effect does not in itself explain the sustained increases in health-care prices since the use 
of lower-cost personnel to perform tasks on behalf of the physician should decrease 
rather than increase prices. 
 
 
 
 
4.3. The Impact of Quality Improvements from Technology 
It is difficult to determine real price trends in health care because the quality of 
health-care services has increased dramatically with the introduction of new technologies 
that are often bundled with traditional services.  If we evaluate the component cost of 
individual procedures, we can better determine if the increases in the overall price level 
are from rising prices or increasing use of technology.  The graph in Figure 7 shows the 
 2000 2009 % Change 
Physicians 111 98 -11.8% 
Registered Nurses 781 840 7.6% 
Aides and Assistants 879 1068 21.6% 
Technicians 369 433 17.3% 
Therapists 138 174 26% 
Total Non Physicians (NP) 2685 3046 13.5% 
Ratio NP to Physician 24 to 1 31 to 1 28.5% 
Source: U. S. Census Bureau (2010)  
 
Table 4-2     Health-Care Workers Per 100,000 Population 
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average real dollar reimbursement to surgeons performing four types of surgeries from 
1960 to the current decade (Hoballah, et al. 2008).  The data provide support for the 
argument that the injection of new technology and not inflation of the price of existing 
health-care products and services is the primary factor affecting the price level of health 
care.   
 
The reimbursement rates in 2006 dollars, shown in Figure 7, represent only the 
amounts paid to the surgeons for conducting the surgery, and do not include the ancillary 
costs of other services that, combined, would cause the overall cost of the procedures to 
be higher.  These supporting services are effectively health-care consumption increases, 
 
Figure 7     Physician Reimbursements 
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for either quality improvements or defensive practices to protect the physician and 
hospital from legal liability. 
 
4.4. Growth in Health-care Consumption 
In addition to the increases in the price level of health care, the graph in Figure 4 
shows the impact of the rising level of the quantity of consumption on overall health-care 
expenditures.  Economic variables that could influence the quantity of consumption 
include: increases in health-care subsidies, an aging population, growth in income (GDP), 
and the adoption of new technology.  The following case studies provide evidence of the 
rise in overall health-care consumption. 
One group looked at the increased usage of epidurals on patients covered by 
Medicare for the periods 2002 and 2006.  In Table 4-3, the number of epidural 
procedures increased at a rate of 59.9%, while the physician fees for the service increased 
just 7% in real dollars.  The results of the study appear to uphold the hypothesis that 
expenditures are rising because of increased consumption (Manchikanti, et al. 2010). 
 
 
 
Table 4-3     Incidents and Fees of Epidurals 
 2002 2006 % Increase  
Epidurals Performed 1,181,080 1,888,140 59.9 
Physician Charges $100.50 $107.50 7.0 
Source: "Analysis of the Growth of Epidural Injections and Costs in the Medicare Population”, Pain 
Physician Journal 2010  
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Another study looked at the increased use of psychotropic prescriptions on 
adolescent patients for the period 1994 to 2001.  Results shown in Table 4-4 are in real 
dollars, and are weighted for changes in population.  The percentage of visits leading to a 
prescription increased by 161.6%, indicating a higher trend in the consumption of 
psychotropic drugs (Thomas, et al. 2006). 
 
 
Table 4-4     Increased Use of Psychotropic Drugs 
  
1994-1995 
 
1996-1997 
 
1998-1999 
 
2000-2001 
% 
Increase 
Psychotropic* Prescriptions 982,606 1,296,831 1,741,471 2,866,103 191.7 
Visits with Prescription Per 1000 54.2 68.3 89.5 141.8 161.6 
Source: "Trends in the Use of Psychotropic Medications Among Adolescents, 
1994 to 2001." Psychiatric Services, 2006.  
*Psychotropic drugs cross the blood–brain barrier and act on the central nervous system.  
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5. ADVISOR-INDUCED DEMAND 
 
Before the twentieth century, the primary-care physician often filled both the role 
of medical advisor and service provider (Beito 2000).  This model is common in virtually 
all professional service industries, including legal services, tax and auditing services, auto 
maintenance, and, of course, health care.  An asymmetric information problem exists in 
these professions because of the complex nature of diagnosing and addressing legal 
issues, accounting errors, engine problems, and medical conditions.  The client or patient 
is rationally ignorant because few people have the time or inclination to learn all that is 
necessary to perform these tasks effectively when the alternative of certified 
professionals is readily available.  An adage from the legal profession says it all: “A man 
who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.”  The use of trusted advisors in 
complex professions has existed for centuries, suggesting that it is the most economically 
efficient approach to the asymmetric information problem (Arrow 1963).  The minimal 
changes in per capita legal, accounting, and auto repair expenditures suggest that, ceteris 
peribus, health-care expenditures would have followed suit. 
Taking advantage of the informational asymmetries inherent in health care, 
physicians, like all professional service providers, have a financial incentive to foist 
economically inefficient procedures on unwitting patients.  To counteract this problem of 
supplier-induced demand, insurance companies often require pre-approval, managed care 
groups require the authorization of an assigned agent physician, and patients rely on the 
integrity of their primary-care physician for recommendation to specialists.  Although 
 25 
 
supplier-induced demand occurs in health care, it was more problematic before the 
increase in specialists, when a physician serving as both medical advisor and service 
provider benefited directly from over-prescribing.  An auto mechanic who both 
recommends and performs an engine rebuild has a different incentive than one who 
diagnoses the problem and recommends that a consumer seek out an independent repair 
facility.   
Advisor-induced demand is the more likely culprit behind the increasing 
consumption in the current health-care system.  Primary-care physicians, attempting to 
consider the patient’s best interest, recommend what they believe is the maximum level 
of affordable care.  However, because of corporate benefits and government subsidies, 
what is “affordable” has expanded beyond what the patient would accept if directly 
responsible for the cost.  In addition, while attempting to provide appropriate professional 
advice to each patient, per the Hippocratic oath, a doctor must consider the risk of a 
malpractice lawsuit.  In other words, physicians are incentivized to practice defensive 
medicine by over-prescribing tests, drugs, and treatments.   
To explain the sustained increases in consumption we have seen over the past 
fifty years, we must consider how a patient interacts with her physician as a trusted 
advisor.  Health-care consumption normally begins when a patient schedules an office 
visit with her primary-care physician.  The patient assumes her doctor will act as a trusted 
advisor, has the skills and knowledge to diagnose and treat her condition, and can 
marshal the necessary resources (Dranove 2000).  Most physicians attempt to do these 
things while minimizing malpractice liability.  Once the patient is in the exam room, the 
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doctor’s incentives encourage recommending all appropriate diagnostics, medical 
treatments, and pharmaceuticals available, restrained financially only by the patient’s out-
of-pocket and insurance coverage.  The existence of the insurance subsidy encourages 
advisor-induced demand, shifting the patient demand curve to the right, thus encouraging 
health-care suppliers to invest in the research and development of even more medical 
technologies.  Health-care innovation grew dramatically after the introduction of the 
third-party payer system in response to the growing advisor-induced demand and the 
growth of per capita GDP.  The graph in Figure 8 shows the number of major 
breakthroughs for the first and second halves of the twentieth century, broken down by 
treatment, diagnostic, and preventive innovations. 
 
 
 
Figure 8     Medical Technology Breakthroughs 
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The number of major treatment technology breakthroughs in the second half of 
the century increased by 111%; new preventive technologies by 150%; and diagnostic 
innovations by 500% (U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources 2009).  The 
number of innovations reflects the level of new products and services, but not the level of 
consumption of the new technologies.  Statistics from three of the most widely acclaimed 
diagnostic breakthroughs indicate dramatic increases in consumption.  The average 
number of emergency room patients receiving MRI/CT/PET scans rose from 13 per 100 
persons in 1996 to 58 in 2007, a 346% increase over the ten-year period (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Resources 2009).  The percentage of adult women 
receiving bi-annual mammograms rose from 24% in 1987 to over 68% in 2007 (National 
Cancer Institute 2010).  The number of colonoscopy procedures performed in ambulatory 
visits increased from 677 per 10,000 visits in 1996 to 1,778 in 2006, rising 163% over the 
decade (U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources 2009). 
In summary, health-care subsidies have not only increased patient demand for 
health care, they have altered the patient/physician relationship by allowing for increased 
levels of advisor-induced demand.  In turn, advisor-induced demand serves as an 
incentive for the development of a never-ending stream of new and potentially inefficient 
medical innovations, further increasing both the number of new medical procedures and 
the cost of existing medical services. 
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6. MORAL HAZARD AND HEALTH RISKS 
 
Economists and insurance actuaries understand that insurance products are 
inherently susceptible to moral hazard.  If patients are convinced that risky lifestyle 
choices are less likely to affect their pocketbooks, they are more likely to engage in high-
risk behaviors such as over-eating, exercising less, or eating unhealthy foods.  Insurance 
companies traditionally rely on three mechanisms to address moral hazard:  (1) patient 
deductibles—the higher the deductible, the more the patient shares in the upfront risk; (2) 
co-insurance, where the patient shares in a percentage of the cost and risk; and, (3) 
restricting coverage for claims that can result from high-risk behavior. 
Before the introduction of the third-party payer system, high out-of-pocket costs 
for routine health care served as a kind of “super” deductible for catastrophic health 
insurance because the same behaviors that increase the occurrence of common health 
problems often increase the risk of catastrophic conditions.  Obesity, for example, 
increases the likelihood of health conditions that require routine care such as “diabetes, 
hypertension, osteoarthritis, chronic back pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, urinary 
incontinence, gastroesophageal reflux disorder, gallstones, and asthma.”  Over time, 
obesity dramatically increases the likelihood of the catastrophic conditions of heart 
failure and stroke (Frankenburg and Zanarini 2006).  If patients have to cover the cost of 
treating the lesser ailments, they are more likely to alter their lifestyle, thus reducing the 
likelihood of the catastrophic problems as well.   
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A case study of obesity illustrates the impact of health-care subsidies on the level 
of moral hazard.  Obese patients spend more on health care than those that are physically 
fit, and the number of obese is increasing, as shown in Table 6-1.  These results show that 
over the twenty years from 1987 to 2007, the percentage of the U.S. population 
categorized as obese grew from 13% to 28%––an increase of 115%.  At the same time, 
per capita health-care expenditures for the obese grew 111% in 2005 dollars, almost 
twice that of the non-obese population (Duchovny and Baker 2010).  These results 
provide support for the contention that the subsidized third-party payer system increases 
the level of moral hazard when combined with traditional catastrophic health insurance. 
 
  
The data indicate that in 1987 the spending per adult for normal weight compared 
to morbidly obese was $2,440 to $2,530, a spread of only 8%.  In 2007, the spending per 
adult for normal weight to morbidly obese was $4,030 to $7,010, a difference of 74%.  
The growth in health-care expenditures on the obese and morbidly obese suggests that 
Table 6-1     Obesity and Health-Care Spending1 
 
 Share of Adult  
Population (%) 
% 
Chg 
Spending per Adult 
(2009 dollars) 
% 
Chg 
Weight Category 1987 2007  1987 2007  
Underweight* 4 2 -50% $3,230 $4,970 54% 
Normal 52 35 -33% $2,440 $4,030 65% 
Overweight 31 35 13% $2,650 $4,260 61% 
Obese 12 24 100% $2,640 $5,330 102% 
Morbidly Obese* 1 4 300% $2,530 $7,010 177% 
All Categories 100 100  $2,560 $4,550  
* Sample sizes for underweight and morbidly obese are too small to be statistically significant. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, “How Does Obesity in Adults Affect Spending on Health 
Care?” 2010. 
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significantly more procedures and technology are being deployed for their care, while the 
growth in the number suffering from obesity might be explained by the low patient cost 
of maintaining the high-risk life style. 
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7. THE COST OF LIFE EXPECTANCY 
 
A common argument for maintaining the health-care status quo is that the high 
cost of U.S. health care is justified because life expectancy is increasing with the level of 
expenditures (Shang and Goldman 2008).  While addressing the issue in this paper is 
important, it is difficult to prove a causal relationship between U.S. health-care 
expenditures and life expectancy.  Many other factors, such as the reduction in the 
number of smokers (Stewart, Cutler and Rosen 2009), the introduction of mandatory 
automobile safety devices (Cummins, et al. 2011), and 911 emergency services (Athey 
and Stern 2002) have played a role in the life expectancy increases we have experienced 
since the 1960s (Lichtenberg 2011).  Extending life expectancy is not the only incentive 
for spending more on health care.  Along with the rise in per capita income, the desire to 
improve the quality of life has increased in importance.  The evidence for this can be seen 
in the growth of cosmetic surgery and the increasing number of new massage therapists 
(U.S. Department of Labor 2011).  Given these qualifiers, the return on life expectancy is 
an important factor to consider.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) tracks life expectancy information for 
most nations, and reports a significant positive correlation between life expectancy and 
expenditures on health care.  The data shown in the Appendix is based on the Healthy 
Adult Life Expectancy (HALE) method of computing life expectancy, which estimates 
the years of healthy life expectancy by subtracting the years of ill health from total life 
expectancy (World Health Organization 2010).  
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The data also show that the 2007 level of U.S. health-care expenditures is 2.2 
standard deviations above the mean, as shown in Figure 9, suggesting that health-care 
consumption in the U.S. is highly inefficient when measured against life expectancy 
(World Health Organization 2009). 
 
 
To move the U.S. to the global mean would require either a 60% reduction in 
expenditures or a fifteen-year increase in life expectancy.  The ratio of U.S. health care to 
GDP from 1960, which sits on the global mean, provides a point of comparison.  Even if 
we assume there is a direct correlation between life expectancy in the U.S. and the 
 
 
Source: World Health Organization: World Health Statistics 2009  
The data in this graph does not include any statistics from African or island nations to 
remove the distortions for HIV epidemics and the above average per capita levels of 
infrastructure health-care costs for small island nations. 
 
Figure 9     Life Expectancy and GDP for Developed Nations 
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increases in health-care expenditures, the graph presents a gloomy picture of the return on 
per capita health-care costs.  While extending life expectancy is desirable, if we continue 
to see increases in real cost, the ratio of expenditures to life expectancy, and the 
percentage of GDP consumed by health care, the existing system will collapse. 
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8. BREAKING THE CYCLE 
 
The sustained increases in medical expenditures follow an unbroken cycle that 
suggests health care will continue to consume more and more of GDP unless something 
changes.  The following steps make up the cycle of sustained increases. 
 
1.  Employer/government provides subsidized health-care coverage for 
more of the population. 
2.  Patient experiences symptoms and meets with primary physician. 
3.  After initial evaluation, physician recommends appropriate procedures, 
medications, and services, including new products and services 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
medical industry. 
4.  Patient pays for out-of-pocket costs, if applicable, and the health-care 
service provider bills the insurance carrier for services. 
5.  Insurance reimburses the health-care service provider for acceptable 
procedures at agreed-upon rates.   
6.  Insurance company adjusts the premium to employer.  Government 
increases taxes or deficit spending to cover increases in expenditures.   
7.  Repeat 
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To address the increasing health-care expenditure problem in the U.S., it will be 
necessary to reduce consumption to an efficient level.  There are only two ways to 
accomplish this: first, by forming large and costly bureaucracies to coerce citizens into 
consuming less health care; or second, by letting Americans continue to choose how 
much to consume but requiring them to directly bear and pay the cost of treatment for 
routine medical conditions.  Canada and many countries in Europe elected for the first 
option, implementing socialized medicine, which, while it has lowered consumption, did 
so by reducing the level of coverage and fixing price levels, resulting in shortages and 
waitlists (Oliver 2009).  For the consumer choice option to succeed, health-care insurance 
coverage must be limited to insurable events—putting the onus on the patient to pay 
directly for all other health-care services, thus eliminating the need for the third-party 
payer system and reducing the moral hazard it magnifies. 
Superficially, this proposal might appear equivalent to the high-deductible plans 
with optional HSAs currently offered by most insurance companies.  However, a high-
deductible plan is not the same as catastrophic insurance, as it provides coverage for non-
insurable events once the out-of-pocket is satisfied, and HSAs remain an unpopular 
option because insurance companies overprice them to compensate for the adverse 
selection problem they exacerbate in traditional policies. In other words, if appropriately 
priced and optional, HSA plans draw the healthiest employees, leaving the highest-risk 
workers in the low-deductible plans.  Average claims in the low-deductible plans then 
increase because of the higher risk pool, forcing the insurance company to raise the 
premiums on either the low-deductible plan or the HSA plan, ensuring that at least one of 
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them is an unattractive option.  Even though the profit margins for HSA plans are much 
higher, the premiums are not being adjusted down accordingly.  The exception to this is 
where a firm chooses to offer a single HSA plan for all employees.4 
                                                
4 In 2009, I was given access to the actuarial data on the various insurance plans of a leading 
health-care insurance company.  For obvious reasons the proprietary data is not available to the public.  The 
HSA plans had claims against premiums of 60% to 65% while PPO plans were averaging 80% to 85% of 
premiums.  If a firm selected an HSA-only option, premiums were reduced to reflect the lower level of 
claims.  In mixed plan offerings, the premiums for the HSA option were increased to discourage their 
adoption.  This is because an insurance company offering a PPO-only plan is able to combine the two risk 
groups, lower the premiums, and present a more competitive PPO offering than a company presenting a 
mixed offering of HSA and PPO.  Since the PPO offerings are generally more advantageous to the higher-
risk employees, an HSA only plan is considered less flexible and for some employees less desirable. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Health-care subsidies by the government and employers provide the incentive for 
sustained increases in health-care consumption.  When patients are not forced to consider 
the real cost of health care, they demand more care than is efficient, and ever-helpful 
physicians recommend increasing levels of diagnostics and treatments, unrestrained by 
questions of expense.  In addition, the third-party payer system increases the level of 
moral hazard associated with health-care insurance, encouraging risky behavior and 
further driving up demand.   
Eliminating the routine-care subsidy will not correct every problem in health care.  
The cost of developing and testing new drugs will be problematic as long as the Food and  
Drug Administration operates at its current level of inefficiency (Philipson and Sun 
2008).  Catastrophic insurance will continue to suffer from the adverse selection problem, 
fueling the debate over the need for some form of universal or mandated coverage.   
 
 38 
 
APPENDIX  - 2007 HEALTH-CARE COSTS TO LIFE EXPECTANCY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
% of GDP  
On Health Care 
HALE Life 
Expectancy 
Argentina 10.1 67 
Australia 8.7 74 
Canada 10 73 
Chile 5.3 70 
China 4.6 66 
Czech Republic 6.9 70 
France 11 73 
Germany 10.6 73 
Greece 9.5 72 
India 3.6 56 
Ireland 7.5 73 
Israel 8 73 
Japan 8.1 76 
Kuwait 2.2 69 
Mexico 6.6 67 
Netherlands 9.4 73 
Pakistan 2 55 
Peru 4.4 67 
Republic of Korea 6.4 71 
Russian Federation 5.3 60 
Spain 8.4 74 
Sweden 9.2 74 
Switzerland 10.8 75 
Thailand 3.5 62 
United Arab Emirates 2.5 68 
United Kingdom 8.2 72 
United States of America 15.3 70 
Venezuela  4.9 66 
Source: World Health Organization, “World Health Statistics 2009” 
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